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Introduction 
It was summer and just months before the grape harvest in Istria, Croatia. Danilo, a winemaker, 
visited his nearby agricultural input supply shop (agraria) urgently seeking a spray to combat a 
common vineyard disease. It was also the middle of the tourist season in this popular vacation 
destination on the Adriatic coast, increasingly visited for its wine. Prior to World War II, Istria 
had been part of Italy and was known for its Malvasia and Teran wines. As part of Yugoslavia, 
the region’s wine production increased, due to the introduction of state wineries and the 
proliferation of small-scale family winemaking. In the early post-socialist period, restrictions on 
private winemaking were lifted. State wineries were eventually privatized beginning in the early 
2000s. With the help of the Istrian Tourist Board and other local institutions, winemaking in the 
region has grown and been professionalized at a rapid pace, such that in recent years Istria has 
been likened to Tuscany and other important winemaking regions of Europe. Croatia’s EU 
accession in July 2013 marked the midway point of my two years of doctoral fieldwork in the 
region, during which time Istrians were adjusting to market and legislative changes that 
challenged them to change everyday business practices. However, I found that some less than 
optimal business practices were increasingly being relied upon as coping mechanisms to deal 
with the rising issue of illiquidity. Many businessmen find themselves in the situation of being in 
long-term debt to clients, waiting for long-term debts to be repaid, or most often both. The 
personal nature of so many business transactions, along with the long process of formally 
pursuing debt collection, contributes to this business environment of debts. In Danilo’s trip to the 
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agraria, he had not anticipated a long-term debt to arise, but eventually this is what occurred, 
leading the respective transactors to turn to a debt resolution practice common to the region. 
When Danilo earnestly visited the agraria that day, he did so without cash, but the agraria’s 
owner Italo gave him the supplies with a verbal assurance of payment in due course because 
Danilo is a long-term customer and neighbour. Italo was confident that he would be paid because 
it was the high season for tourism, when he knew that Danilo would be making the bulk of his 
cash wine sales. Indeed, Danilo expected to run out of wine before the season ended and was 
worried about how to fill those committed orders. Meanwhile, not spraying the vineyards risked 
losing an entire harvest in a matter of days. However, in the weeks that followed, events 
conspired that made paying the agraria impossible, Danilo later explained. He wanted to resolve 
this situation because he needed to maintain a good relationship with Italo to have continued 
access to inputs. Yes, he could buy supplies elsewhere, but this agraria is conveniently located 
between his home and his vineyards, he explained, and the next nearest one is an inconvenient 
distance away in a different municipality. Further complicating matters, he said, this is a small 
community, and it was not worth the risk of developing a bad reputation. The debt was 12,000 
kuna, which is approximately two months’ salary for many rural residents. In speaking with 
Italo, they agreed that Danilo would try to ‘close the debt’. This is how Danilo explained the 
situation and how he ultimately resolved it: 
 
I bought 12,000 kuna of chemicals from an agraria, even though I did not have cash, 
because we were friends, and we agreed that I would pay him when I sold my wine. I 
sold 2,000 bottles of wine to a gostione, which sold my wine but failed to pay me. Thus, I 
could not pay the agraria! Now, I have to find a person who owes the gostione who is 
also a client of the agraria who will pay the agraria and close the debt. Probably I will 
not find someone to resolve one hundred percent of the debt, but if I can resolve eighty 
percent, maybe that will be small enough for the gostione to manage to pay me. I have to 
call my friends and everyone I know and communicate with people to find a solution.  
 
Eventually, Danilo found Marko, a builder who owed the restaurant for various items he had 
bought second-hand and was also waiting for payment from Italo at the agraria for work he had 
done, decreasing Danilo’s debt to a point where it was possible for Danilo to pay the small 
balance in cash. Locally, they call this debt resolution process lanac kompenzacija, or ‘chain 
compensation’, so called because businessmen construct a chain of debtors to write off debt. 
Danilo explained that finding such common clients to close debts is an exercise in using and 
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even broadening his market knowledge, as he must communicate in detail with businessmen in 
his community about debts and business relationships. The pervasiveness of this system means 
that the details of the business dealings of Danilo, as of Istrians in general, are not private, but 
rather circulate through society on an as-needed basis. 
Lanac kompenzacija is a common way to resolve debts in Istria’s business community. It 
forms part of a larger system of kompenzacija transactions used to resolve long-standing debts 
that have grown in importance in the context of rising economic precarity in Croatia in general.
2
 
Using this system, if a businessman can figure out through conversations who owes his debtor 
and who owes that debtor’s debtor, and so on down the line, he can construct a chain of debtors. 
Joining a debt chain allows a businessman to write off the debt of one client by virtue of a 
second businessman writing off his debt to him. Although the businessman is not paid in cash, he 
also has one less debt of his own. This means that cash does not necessarily enter into a lanac 
kompenzacija transaction. Once a chain has been constructed and the values of the debts 
confirmed, all parties circulate a receipt called a statement of clearance, and sign, stamp and fax 
copies down the chain. In Danilo’s case he was able to find Marko, who closed the debt chain 
enough for Danilo to pay the balance. However, it is common for there to be ten or more 
participants, and for no cash to be involved because the chain balances the various accounts.  
Despite its utility, lanac kompenzacija is far from the preferred system, and as such is often 
the topic of debate and lamentations in village cafés. The debt resolution practices prevalent in 
Istria’s business community today have in common the fact that each transaction began with the 
expectation of cash payment for the goods or services. However, after months pass by, instead of 
being paid, the increasingly impatient businessman must ultimately request or demand payment 
from his debtor. Sometimes, as in Danilo’s situation, the debtor may initiate the resolution. 
Nonetheless, regardless of who initiates, the outcome is that the transactors must negotiate new 
terms because the debtor either lacks the cash or the will to fulfil his payment obligation. Of 
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course, these new terms serve the interest of the debtor, who is on his way to avoiding paying 
cash. The owed party, desperate to resolve a debt, often agrees to lanac kompenzacija or other 
kompenzacija arrangements. In reflecting on the pervasiveness of lanac kompenzacija in Istrian 
business transactions, a winemaker quipped that, ‘See, Istrians are wizards. We know how to do 
business without money’. 
Initiating lanac kompenzacija is not a neutral act. Rather, it is sometimes expressed by 
informants as feeling uncomfortable, as the mere voicing of needing to be paid can feel like they 
are revealing they are in such dire financial straits that they are desperate for cash — and by 
extension, they are admitting to being bad businessmen, incapable of managing their own 
finances. A wife of a winemaker telling such a story said regretfully, ‘It makes him feel like he is 
less of a man. It is embarrassing for him, but it should be embarrassing to him [the debtor], not 
my husband!’ Indeed, in relaying another debt collection story, one winemaker described feeling 
ashamed for having to approach his debtor. Such expressions reveal the social tensions at play in 
these business relationships. These debt resolution practices may thus be understood as 
unsatisfactory coping strategies. Cash is nearly always preferred to non-cash resolutions — at 
least from the perspective of the person who is owed. 
Importantly, a businessman waiting for payment who also owes another firm payment will 
agree to join the chain at the request of his client as a favour. The debts of clients thus initiate a 
process that is repeated throughout the economy in such a way that diverse business actors find 
themselves related to one another in new and interesting configurations. New favours and 
obligations tie these new relations. Lanac kompenzacija thus shows us how debts may ultimately 
create new relationships that extend beyond the initial transactors. 
 
The sociality of debt 
As he packed his wine bottles into cartons in his wine-tasting room in a hillside village in 
northwest Istria, Lorenzo explained that agreeing to lanac kompenzacija is a favour because with 
cash, of course, he can decide to pay employees’ salaries or utility bills, whereas lanac 
kompenzacija simply writes off a debt. Joining helps a client urgently resolve their debt, so the 
businessman is choosing to forego a continued wait that could finally result in a payment in cash. 
Importantly, Lorenzo and others stressed, someone agreeing to accept or participate in lanac 
kompenzacija is considered pošten towards one’s clients — a moral value that encapsulates the 
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characteristics of trustworthiness, honesty, loyalty and being honourable — as participation in 
such chains contributes to one’s reputation as someone who helps others. The pervasiveness of 
lanac kompenzacija has contributed to the emergence of a dense system of favour relationships, 
and indeed to function well it relies on this density of favour relationships and the widespread 
acceptance of the practice. Its pervasiveness creates some measure of security in transactions in 
general, as a businessman knows that, even if a client fails to pay a debt, there are ways of 
resolving the issue. There are usually more than financial reasons incentivizing the resolution of 
debts, too, including the desire to continue business with the person in question, but also social 
reasons because so many businessmen are connected through friends, family and proximity. 
I found myself reflecting increasingly on the curious pervasiveness of lanac kompenzacija in 
this business community, as such stories were so often revealed to me in conversations with 
winemakers and small businessmen about problems they faced and how they were coping with 
the economic crisis in Europe. In my notebooks, on scraps of paper, on backs of receipts and 
even on napkins in cafés, the pens in the hands of my informants would draw arrows between 
these relationships, sums of debts and waiting times, and I would be left with barely legible 
scrawl to compare against my carefully written notes. I began carrying two pens to interviews, as 
my informants would so often, in an excited and sometimes somewhat agitated state, suddenly 
take my pen and notebook from me mid-story to ‘clarify’ such relationships. I would sit there 
watching them talk out the chains, drawing arrows back and forth and circling names and 
numbers in an animated voice, leaving me in awe of the complexity and simultaneous sadness 
that what we were ultimately discussing was why they were not able to pay for their health 
insurance, home improvements, winery investments, college for their children or other important 
life necessities. The questions that captivated me in these conversations were: Why do these 
businessmen continue to do business with chronic debtors? Should they not simply close the debt 
and walk away, refuse to go into business with the debtor again and gossip about his bad 
behaviour in cafés? In this time of restricted liquidity, why would people not be avoiding debt at 
all costs? I would pose such questions to my informants during their storytelling if I could get a 
word in edgewise. Their answers made me realize that instead, its regular practice means that 
debts may actually have social lives of their own. Indeed, lanac kompenzacija makes me look at 
debt differently, to consider its positive qualities. In asking such basic questions, what unfolded 
was an understanding of how lanac kompenzacija shapes relationships in this small business 
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community. 
 
In problematizing the dynamics of lanac kompenzacija in Istria, Sneath’s (2012) concept of 
enactions comes to mind. In Mongolian communities, Sneath (2012: 459) describes how gifts 
and favours may be given in ways that are not sufficiently defined as transactions, but rather are 
‘enactions of aspects of persons and roles for which the language of obligation and expectation is 
more appropriate than the idiom of exchange’. Although lanac kompenzacija is a transaction in a 
more traditional sense, with goods with a monetary value being exchanged in a business context, 
the notion that the aspect of persons and their roles also have value, and indeed are centrally 
important, may serve to elucidate lanac kompenzacija’s role in society. Here, the decision — and 
one’s suitability — to take part in a transaction is to a great degree informed by a person’s 
qualities and social position in the social landscape of the local economy. In Danilo’s situation, 
Marko had to be willing to step in to fill this very strange position of both owing a restaurant and 
waiting for payment from an agraria. Indeed, had I pressed Danilo at the time, it would have 
been surprising if he could have named an alternative individual to Marko who could fit into 
such a niche. In all likelihood, it would have taken multiple other businessmen to link two such 
seemingly disparate businesses. Thus, rather than engaging in a transaction, agreeing to 
participate in lanac kompenzacija may be characterized as an enaction — of one’s social 
relationships, reputation as pošten, knowledge of the business relationships of others in the 
community, and outstanding obligations and favours towards others already in circulation, not to 
mention a confirmation that one values one’s client to the extent that one is willing to accept a 
sub-optimal resolution voluntarily. 
However, the fact that lanac kompenzacija is only initiated due to a long-standing debt 
suggests that the debtor is untrustworthy — and worse, that they are not pošten. Thus, asserting 
that debt may build relationships is paradoxical because debt should motivate the owed party to 
find a way to resolve the debt and then exit the relationship. Instead, I found that business 
relationships are long-term, even with debtors. Debts are resolved through lanac kompenzacija 
and relationships continue with the same clients — like Danilo, who was again able to buy goods 
from Italo’s agraria. From the perspective of my informants, resolving debts through lanac 
kompenzacija allows for the continuation of business relationships within a context of restricted 
liquidity — it is a facilitator. In the process, lanac kompenzacija can create even stronger bonds 
Smith, Economy of trust 
 
7 
 
between transacting parties because a favour has been done, extending this new obligation to 
return the favour into the future. Not only that, but this way of friendly reconciliation seems to 
soften the frustration of the client waiting for payment. That is, in analysing how lanac 
kompenzacija works in society, one finds that debt may contribute to building relationships 
instead of destroying them. 
Another aspect of enaction here is one’s local market knowledge. Again reflecting on 
Danilo’s situation, the type of person who would ultimately fit into Marko’s position of 
connecting these two businesses is not intuitive, but rather relies on the market knowledge of the 
transactors. In a businessman’s research to construct a chain, conversations about debt require a 
deep understanding of the local and regional market — importantly, who does business with 
whom and how much, and who is on good terms with whom. Thus, market knowledge is a 
crucial element in resolving one’s debt, and knowledge-bearers are important allies. As a result 
of intense communication about business relationships over space and time, businessmen learn 
about the other debts of their clients and other people in their community, as well as the reasons 
for those debts. This reveals how important it is to be on good terms with one’s clients: in a case 
of chronic debt, transactors must be willing to reveal their business connections. In this way, a 
businessman’s market knowledge signals trustworthiness, as it means that many clients have 
repeatedly entrusted him with valuable information. 
 
An economy of trust defined by debts 
The fact that transactors must be willing to discuss other business relationships of theirs honestly 
with their clients reveals that lanac kompenzacija relies upon businessmen being trustworthy. 
The process of communicating leads to finding the links to make a chain and people offering 
favours to join it. This fosters trust and faith, which is paradoxical in the context of a 
conversation about a long overdue debt. Additionally, through interviews it became apparent that 
businessmen engaging with clients whose reliability is either unknown or known to be tenuous 
must have a strong level of trust that, regardless of their client’s ultimate ability to repay, a debt 
will be resolved. However, such trust did not appear to come from the general institutional 
environment in which they work, in the sense that issues like the economic downturn, the 
relative newness of the free market of the West and national corruption scandals were often 
referenced in conversations about a lack of confidence, or trust, in the market in general. Rather, 
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the businessmen with whom I spoke trust that, in the event of non-payment, debt resolutions are 
still possible, often explaining such beliefs with the phrases ćemo se naći (‘We’ll figure it out’), 
or more commonly snađi se (similar, but a phrase used to express the ability to make ends meet 
in a resourceful way), implying that social connections come into play in resolving economic 
issues. This is precisely because of the pervasiveness of lanac kompenzacija and other forms of 
kompenzacija. Although not ideal, as informants would emphasize by reiterating that cash is 
always preferred, knowing that kompenzacija is an (imperfect) option does facilitate business 
transactions. In this way, a practice that one might be quick to characterize as reflecting only 
deep structural problems — like economic deficiency or continued reliance on informal business 
practices — may simultaneously be characterized as a stabilizing force. It is through this 
dichotomy between being reflective of structural problems and potentially creating stability that 
lanac kompenzacija practices shed light on the role of debt in society. Ultimately, lanac 
kompenzacija’s pervasiveness, I suggest, contributes to this economy’s strength and resilience. I 
suggest further that the widespread faith that debts may be resolved through one’s reliance on 
one’s community may be conceptualized as an economy of trust.3 
Anthropological research in other contexts has found that in communities reliant upon trust 
to organize business, the time it takes to cultivate trust between clients at an individual level 
means that businessmen try to maintain long-term business relationships (see Harriss 2003: 763; 
Menning 1997: 69). Kirman and Vriend (2000: 51) found through quantitative economic 
research in the Marseilles fish market, where fishmongers and restauranteurs engage in multiple 
daily transactions, that ‘Both buyers and sellers are better off in loyal trading relationships’ when 
the relationships are assessed over the long-term, in what they term a ‘coevolutionary process’ 
(ibid.: 54). A partnership or commitment creates a level of security that can help to weather 
changing markets (Lorenz 1988: 209). Relatedly, as Harriss (2003: 755) explained, trust is highly 
personalized in that it develops out of repeated positive interactions that conform to society’s 
norms. In fact, many studies of trust in business suggest that trust and loyalty are reinforced by 
regularly repeating business transactions (see Kirman and Vriend 2000; Lomnitz and Sheinbaum 
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2004; Menning 1997). In a study of French industrial relations, Lorenz (1988: 209) argued that 
although ‘promoting trust is costly… lack of trust is more costly still’ because it creates market 
volatility, as well as the burden of checking more thoroughly the trustworthiness of potential 
clients, which ultimately inhibits everyday business. Such research suggests that trust helps to 
facilitate transactions. Indeed, even in developed economies the importance of trust in business 
relationships is emphasized by economists because it ‘presupposes decision-making in a 
situation of risk’ inherent in exchange that the client will exploit an opportunity to break the 
contract (ibid.: 197). Thus, trust in another person’s honesty is important in facilitating trade in 
market economies (Dasgupta 1988: 64; see also Williamson 1993).  
However, despite the importance of trust in facilitating business relationships, I found that in 
Istria it is not sufficient on its own. When speaking with Istrian informants about trust at an 
individual level, a person’s repeated good behaviour, for example, in being pošten or being 
willing to engage in lanac kompenzacija in the past, were referenced when speaking about those 
with whom they were willing to do business. Here, past behaviour is important in building trust. 
Gambetta (1988: 234) stresses that, ‘Trust is a peculiar belief predicated not on evidence but on 
the lack of contrary evidence’. Indeed, if one interprets this lack of contrary evidence as 
suggesting looking at past behaviour, then reputation may be partially incorporated into our 
understanding of trust. Pagden (1988: 129) points out that trust is always ultimately a belief in 
that one ‘cannot in fact ever be in possession of sufficient information to know that they will not 
act in entirely unforeseen ways. I trust them not to do so. What I have will always be a belief’. 
Going further, Offer (1997: 454) characterizes trust as being similar to a gift in that there is a 
‘transfer with the expectation, but no certainty, of reciprocity’. I found that this aspect of 
uncertainty as inherent in trust is reduced in Istria by the reliance upon one’s character being 
evaluated as pošten, adding an aspect of reputation and recognition of past behaviour to what is 
otherwise a more general feeling. In these ways, it becomes evident the notion that pošten may in 
fact be an enaction — in business relationships generally, but also specifically when lanac 
kompenzacija comes into play. It positions an individual in the local social system as well as 
historically, allowing businessmen to make informed decisions. Istrians hold a generalized trust 
in their community being able to resolve long-term debts through lanac kompenzacija or other 
forms of kompenzacija, and trust at an individual level is important for engaging in business, 
being built through reputation. 
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Over the course of research, I found that businessmen would do background checks on 
potential business partners by calling friends, making it clear that one’s behaviour would always 
be watched and evaluated. As a researcher and long-term resident in the community, I was 
likewise relentlessly assessed through this lens, being asked personal questions to gauge my 
truth-telling, and tested to see whether I would reveal the business details of others or my 
opinions about other winemakers. My character was constantly under scrutiny, and my good 
reputation opened many doors as time progressed. My informants considered such 
reconnaissance normal behaviour in making business decisions, with one young winemaker 
explaining over pizza at his home that it was a matter of protecting oneself in this market. The 
questions asked over the course of their background checks were not purely about business 
behaviour, but about the character of the individual, and so much more knowledge about the 
person was gathered than simply their business relationships. In other words, reputation was an 
important component in building trust, where the quality of being pošten was a factor in deciding 
whether or not to do business with someone else. 
Reputation has been recognized elsewhere as an important backdrop to the enforcement of 
contracts, particularly in economies characterized by informal business transactions and in 
contexts where formal contract enforcement is poor (see Gambetta 1994; Greif 1993; Harriss 
2003; J. Humphrey and Schmitz 1998; Lyon and Porter 2009; Murphy 2002; Paine 1967; 
Platteau 1994; White 1994). In Istria, this intermingling of trust and reputation in business 
relationships reveals how being pošten may be considered integral to the functioning of Istria’s 
economy. As the chain of debtors in any lanac kompenzacija resolution usually crosses sectors 
as diverse as construction, agribusiness and tourism, very quickly one may see how the region’s 
economy becomes tied together in a dense network of relationships defined by debts, favours, 
obligations, trust and pošten behaviour.4 
 
Pushing the limits of trust 
Until now, I have focused on how trust, being pošten, debt and lanac kompenzacija interact in 
relations between small businessmen in Istria. Of course, trust and reputation have a dynamic 
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influence in many economies, debt is pervasive across Croatia, Istrian businessmen do business 
with those outside of their immediate community, and lanac kompenzacija and other 
kompenzacija debt resolution systems may be found elsewhere. As I investigated the workings of 
lanac kompenzacija among Istrian winemakers, I began to realize that, as the social distance 
between transactors widens, new issues emerge, particularly with reference to the problem of 
resolving debt. Winemakers lamented that, although lanac kompenzacija is important for 
facilitating business locally, larger companies have been increasingly engaging in the practice as 
well. It is not simply a problem that larger sums of money are in question, but that lanac 
kompenzacija is increasingly turned to, almost as a given. That is, some informants referred to 
lanac kompenzacija as a strategy employed by these larger companies to avoid paying their debts 
with cash. As such stories accumulated in my notebooks, it was difficult not to see from their 
perspective how this ad hoc form of debt resolution could feel predatory when it involved a 
larger, distant corporation. 
It was spring 2013, and I was sitting in the administrative office of a winery helping to 
translate a website with a winemaker, Marino. His bookkeeper Elena was on the phone and 
would periodically interject in our conversation with work-related comments and questions. She 
was busy finalizing paperwork for a lanac kompenzacija transaction with their largest buyer, a 
nation-wide supermarket called Sunsa. Marino had been waiting for Sunsa to pay him for his 
wine sold in 2012, with receipts totalling 96,000 kuna (or approximately €12,600). Although 
Marino had called Sunsa’s headquarters in Zagreb many times, each time being told he was on 
the priority list to be paid, Marino had yet to receive a single payment. He was reluctant to 
continue sending his wine to the supermarket until this debt was resolved, but also did not want 
to lose his largest client, as it would be difficult to find another supermarket to buy his wine and 
even more difficult to find multiple smaller buyers to take care of the same volume. It is hard 
work to get a contract with a large supermarket chain, so it is not something one wants to put in 
jeopardy. Eventually, Marino proposed to Sunsa’s accountant they arrange lanac kompenzacija, 
believing this was the only way he was going to resolve this debt.  
After being advised by other bookkeepers she knows about potential avenues to resolve this, 
using her own knowledge of the industry and through long conversations with various people in 
Sunsa’s accounting office, Elena was able to learn that Sunsa was waiting for the state to pay it 
69,000 kuna in bottle recycling rebates. This was fortuitous, Elena explained, because Marino 
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owed the state 66,000 kuna in bottle taxes. Thus, in order to avoid paying cash to Sunsa, the state 
bottle tax office agreed to write off 66,000 kuna of Marino’s debt to it in return for Sunsa writing 
off 66,000 kuna of the state’s debt. Sunsa was left owing Marino just 30,000 kuna of the original 
amount, and its bookkeeper in charge of Marino’s account agreed to pay in cash in instalments.  
 
Figure 1. Lanac kompenzacija with a supermarket (Sunsa) 
 Sunsa    owes 96,000 kuna to   Marino 
 Marino  owes 66,000 kuna to  state office 
 State office  owes 69,000 kuna to  Sunsa 
 
As Elena later explained, it was still possible that this 30,000 kuna would take time to resolve, 
and indeed it was possible that Sunsa would only pay one of the multiple instalments, again 
allow the debt to lapse, and leave Marino to create yet another lanac kompenzacija or agree to 
take goods, for example, in lieu of cash payment.
5
 In an exasperated tone, Elena also pointed out 
that, according to the contract with Sunsa, resolving a debt through lanac kompenzacija incurs a 
three percent charge on the value of the resolved debt. I immediately asked if it depended on who 
initiated it, as this seemed unfair because Sunsa was the one delaying payment. She got out the 
documentation and pointed to the line in the contract to show me that, regardless of who initiates 
it, that it was the client (the winemaker) who would pay.  
I began to realize that, given this allocation of costs and liabilities, it indeed felt as if it was 
in the interest of the debtor to delay payment, as it would allow them to retain more liquidity and 
use that money for other debts or investments. Moreover, if the debt lasted long enough for their 
client to become desperate, they could earn three percent on the transaction! As I sat back and 
processed this state of affairs, Elena resumed printing and faxing the statement of clearance to 
resolve the debt. Later, she turned to her large bookshelf and took out a massive three-inch 
binder ominously labelled by hand in bold capitals in black ink: ‘KOMPENZACIJA, 2013’. My 
eyes fixed on the bookshelf to dwell on the number of binders. ‘Croatians love bureaucracy’, I 
sarcastically told myself in an effort to minimize my own shock, but it was hard not to wonder 
                                                 
5
 This is a different form of kompenzacija, to be elaborated upon elsewhere. 
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how much of their total business consisted of these types of debt resolution schemes.
6
 Did cash 
ever materialize in this economy, I fatalistically wondered? 
Through conversations with businessmen who had worked in state firms in Yugoslavia, I 
began to uncover some interesting truths about lanac kompenzacija. One such insight was that 
the system is reminiscent of what was locally called ‘passing the bill’ (in Croatian, prolaziti 
račun) in the Yugoslav era in that it connects firms on an ad hoc basis to solve liquidity 
problems.
7
 This is important because it is in part the familiarity with such kompenzacija schemes 
that lends its usage legitimacy in contexts where it may not be entirely legitimate. In lanac 
kompenzacija, however, the goal is to write off as many debts as possible. Everyone who agrees 
to be part of the transaction wants to decrease or erase their debt. This is not the typical debt off-
setting prevalent in early post-socialist transition Russia that is characterized as barter, where 
goods would change hands until they reached a firm that could use them, or other goods the firm 
needed circled to return to the original sender (Humphrey 2000: 77). Humphrey (2000: 77-8) 
details how barter chains worked in early transition Russia in order for businesses to acquire the 
goods they needed for production without using precious and scarce cash. Although ultimately 
they may look similar because of the chains created, such chains diverge from lanac 
kompenzacija because the chains were devised before the transactions began. The same is true in 
the ‘economy of arrears’ described by Ledeneva (2006: 119), where companies were already in 
debt chains due to the highly vertically integrated nature of the Soviet economy. In the various 
debt-offsetting practices prevalent in Croatia today, the assumption at the beginning of the 
transaction was that cash payment would be made, and then, when it is not, businessmen must 
undertake a search to construct a chain, using their social networks and market knowledge. 
Another obvious but important difference is that Croatia is no longer in a state of turbulent 
transition. In the early post-socialist period, the impetus for alternative modes of debt resolution 
and off-setting were the instability of currencies and the unavailability of goods. Today, such 
                                                 
6
 I asked some informants to estimate the percentage of business conducted through various forms of kompenzacija, 
but the numbers were wide-ranging between businesses, varied from year to year, and were impossible to verify. 
Some informants said they refused to ever resolve debts this way, while others asserted large percentages. 
7
 Prolaziti račun was a system between state firms that the directors would arrange before mandatory financial 
reporting to create a chain of firms with the profitable firms lending money to others in their area that were loss-
making, together creating an informal financial repayment plan that included favours in buying or trading one 
another’s goods after the reporting period had passed. These inter-firm favours led to a tightly interdependent local 
economy that cultivated both loyalty and trust between management, as working together in this way helped them to 
avoid state intervention and saved the jobs of the directors of otherwise economically faltering firms. 
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issues do not exist. Thus, we must be more critical in asking why lanac kompenzacija is 
employed as a strategy. 
Although lanac kompenzacija is a widespread phenomenon, and its use by large firms is not 
specific to supermarkets, as supermarkets tend to buy huge quantities of products at once, the 
effect of their non-payment is felt strongly by Istrian agri-food producers like winemakers. This 
is discouraging to these producers, as some informants explained that the reason they had 
pursued business with Sunsa was because they were weary of the business practices employed by 
other large national supermarkets that were even more cumbersome. Many Istrian businessmen 
explained that, at the beginning of the relationship with supermarkets, the client tends to pay on 
time. It is only as one’s reliance on them grows that they begin to delay payments more 
regularly. When replicated throughout the economy, these large companies are essentially using 
their vast client base to write off debts, rather than pay debts with cash. Although Sunsa’s 
contracts give it ninety days to pay its bills, practically speaking some Istrian businessmen say 
they have waited for over a year. Over the years, Sunsa’s payment delays have grown longer, 
despite the company’s growth. One winemaker explained that, ‘I call, beg, and they say I am on 
their priority list, and then again I hear nothing for weeks’. Eventually, these clients become 
desperate and again agree to revised payment terms. Here again, lanac kompenzacija becomes 
yet another way of maintaining one’s liquidity. In short, from the perspective of small 
businessmen, Sunsa has adopted a local ad hoc practice and turned it into a strategy to conserve 
its liquidity. Theoretically, through the circulation of receipts through statements of clearance, 
Sunsa can cancel its debts without taking cash out of its account, thus reserving this cash for 
investments. 
 
The inevitability of debt and lanac kompenzacija 
Stories about debt and lanac kompenzacija made me increasingly interested in the institutional 
environment that seemed to be passively encouraging the persistence of these issues. How is it 
possible that large supermarkets can go so many months without paying their clients? One might 
anticipate that in a recession businessmen would resort to any means necessary, including legal 
measures, to collect outstanding debts. Instead, Istrian businessmen often explain that pursuing 
the resolution of debts through formal bureaucratic processes is the least desirable option in 
terms of both its social and its business repercussions. The circulation of stories — either 
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authentic or exaggerated — about costly, protracted and unsatisfactory court processes dissuade 
businessmen from pursuing debt resolution through the courts. One restauranteur explained that 
a court decision does not guarantee payment of a debt because, if the debtor is truly bankrupt, the 
court may only block his bank accounts, and the client will have lost time and money on legal 
fees without necessarily being reimbursed for the debt, giving a lengthy example of his personal 
experience to illustrate his point. Other informants also asserted that it was possible that during 
the process of blocking the debtor’s accounts, which required the businessman to notarize 
receipts and file them through a lawyer – who must send a notification of a claim being filed to 
the debtor – that there is time for the debtor to move money to avoid repayment before the 
account is actually blocked. The consequences of pursuing debts through legal means also 
include spoiling relationships with other businesses in one’s community — other existing clients, 
potential clients, or clients of clients. Referring to large clients like Sunsa, one winemaker said, 
‘You must remember who you are fighting here’, in that the feeling was that there was no way a 
small businessman could win a legal battle against a large, nation-wide corporation, whether or 
not this is true in practice. 
This made me dwell on the power of the stories themselves. I realized through such 
conversations that first-, second- and third-hand accounts, not to mention basic perceptions about 
the legal process, were themselves enough to deter the pursuit of debts through formal legal 
routes. This, I surmised, underlies the seemingly pervasive belief that coming to a cooperative 
agreement is always preferable to cutting ties. The belief that legal measures do not guarantee a 
just outcome is compounded by the experience of the social and business consequences of 
pursuing debts through the courts, which creates friction with other related businessmen or 
people in one’s social network. As one winemaker explained in a conversation about debt, this 
occurs because once legal processes get underway, the debtor’s account is blocked such that no 
one else may be paid and the debtor cannot continue doing business. This has a ripple effect that 
implicates the businessman pursuing the debt in now influencing other peoples’ business 
dealings. As a result, some informants said that, as a courtesy to their debtor clients, they would 
inform them of their intent to pursue the blocking of their accounts before actually doing so as a 
sort of threat in the hope that it would spur payment.
8
 Thus, at least during my years of 
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 The veracity of such statements could not be confirmed, and indeed, were a businessman to do such a thing as 
forewarn their debtor client and then actually pursue blocking the account, it would seem all the more likely that the 
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researching and residing in Istria (2012-2017) in the midst of the protracted economic crisis that 
was plaguing Europe, there was a great incentive to resolve debts privately.  
I was sitting late one evening at a village café with Italo, a young farmer in a village near my 
own. His family is known in the area for being diligent farmers of a large territory of field crops 
and for having good, long-term relationships with winemakers who buy the family’s grapes in 
large volumes. His face beet red from months under the sun, Italo explained to me over drinks 
that it is ‘impossible’ to escape debtors, and impossible to escape lanac kompenzacija. He began 
to gesture in the air to visualize how all companies are ultimately linked to each other. To his 
mind, all large businesses have debts and engage at least to some extent in lanac kompenzacija. 
On this basis, he began explaining that some small businesses must do business with larger ones 
due to the simple fact that there is not a great deal of choice in such a small economy, and so, if 
you do business with these smaller businesses who do business with large companies, you will 
unavoidably enter into debt relationships, as they are all somehow linked in a ‘chain’ anyway. 
This revealed another interesting truth about lanac kompenzacija: its pervasiveness locally 
makes it feel like an inevitability of doing business, normalizing its practice and adding to its 
power in society. Just as lanac kompenzacija appears similar in form to ‘passing the bill’ in 
socialist Yugoslavia, creating a feeling of familiarity, this feeling of inevitability likewise makes 
lanac kompenzacija feel legitimate in contexts where it objectively may not be so. If, like Italo, 
most businessmen in Istria were conceptualizing the economy as a closed system containing 
large firms that use lanac kompenzacija to avoid paying cash, I could indeed understand why it 
would feel like debt and lanac kompenzacija were inevitabilities. In listening to such stories — 
from experiences with Sunsa and various other large companies to visualized schematics of the 
structure of the economy — I would reflect on the implications for trust. Trust in institutions 
shaping the economy and legal environment, trust in specific clients and trust in the market all 
seemed to hinge on perceptions formed from negative first-hand experiences or hearsay about 
dramatic failures in one of these fields. 
However, I also began to realize that these stories of legal problems and feelings of 
inevitability seemed to encourage — or at least justify — the informalization of business 
transactions from the outset. In other words, what good is a formal contract if the parties both 
                                                                                                                                                             
debtor would have used this intervening period to empty his accounts, as informants asserted would occur. Thus, 
such statements should be met with a degree of scepticism. 
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perceive there to be no institutional enforcement mechanism anyway and will have to resort to 
alternative forms of debt resolution? Indeed, many businessmen in this community engage in 
semi-formal or informal business practices in some part of their lives, whether it is getting a car 
fixed by a mechanic, buying or trading for inputs or resolving temporary farm labour salaries 
through in-kind payments. In such transactions, trust and being pošten rise yet further in 
importance, as there is absolutely no formal fall-back measure to enforce payment. 
 
Conclusion: echoes of informality 
Thus, although lanac kompenzacija creates an economy of trust based on the enactions of 
individuals’ characteristics of trustworthiness, being pošten, market knowledge and social 
connections, when adopted by companies further afield the same practice challenges Istrians to 
reconcile their conceptualizations of it as an ad hoc necessity locally with the feeling that, when 
it is used for larger transactions with companies like supermarkets, it is predatory or strategic. 
The examples above reveal how locally debts resolved through lanac kompenzacija create new 
favour obligations between participants, add to one’s reputation as a pošten individual and 
facilitate the continuation of important business relationships. However, when more socially 
distant actors appear in the matrix of lanac kompenzacija, different issues emerge. In Istria’s 
economy of trust, debt has a social life, and lanac kompenzacija brings such relationships to 
light. Its practice additionally highlights the power of the institutions, perceptions and narratives 
of others in guiding peoples’ economic behaviour. 
Understanding the complexities of lanac kompenzacija now, we can go back briefly to my 
own introduction to the phenomenon to situate it in a broader context of what it is not, why this 
is important for our understanding of its persistence in the economy, and how Istrians make 
sense of it themselves. When I first learned the term kompenzacija, and before I could figure out 
how to spell it, informants would explain it to me by way of referencing baratto, which is Italian 
for barter. Although there are many forms of kompenzacija, and although I have dealt here with 
only a specific form of debt off-setting that does not include the transfer of goods in the chain, 
Istrians conceptually lump all the various forms of kompenzacija into this single category of 
baratto and use the word kompenzacija to refer to multiple forms of it. This created a great deal 
of misunderstanding between myself and my informants at the start, as I was unaware of their 
transitions from explaining one form to another. I began to categorize the examples myself for 
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clarity so that I could go back and ask more pointed questions of my informants, returning with 
their scribbles in my notebooks to point out the ambiguities that I only realized after such 
interviews. However, over time I began to notice that grouping such diverse transactions under 
the single vague rubric of baratto was a problem for them as well, but for more serious reasons.  
Barter, at least in its most basic conceptualization, is defined as a coincidence of wants 
between two transactors who come together and negotiate freely over one another’s goods. 
Anthropologists have spent a great deal of time researching barter in various contexts, mostly in 
the field of informal exchange, to reveal the complexities of such exchange relationships. Some 
aspects of barter were indeed echoed through conversations about lanac kompenzacija. For 
example, Humphrey (1992:107) problematized the idea that barter is a voluntary, ‘ungoverned 
agreement between individuals’. Cellarius (2000: 75) found in Bulgaria that fairness in 
negotiations was important for establishing one’s reputation as trustworthy. In northeast Nepal, 
Humphrey (1992: 107-8) found that barter may engender its own morality because of the social 
rules of fairness and trust, where mutual dependence kept parties from cheating (ibid.: 123). 
Humphrey and Hugh-Jones (1992: 8-9) revealed how such mutual dependence may even lead to 
the development of barter networks. Moreover, Humphrey (2000: 72) found ‘debt chains’ in 
Russia that were made up of barter relations, showing how debts may travel distances and last 
years, and that members of these chains may ‘constantly reconstitute [themselves] from the 
people they know (‘partners’)’ and create social relations. Finally, Ferraro (2004: 89) has shown 
how debt and guilt intermingle, as debts may be imbued with moral obligations.  
However, lanac kompenzacija is not barter, and nor are the other kompenzacija forms I 
found in the region. In all cases, the transaction agreement was entered into under the assumption 
that cash would be paid. The revised debt resolution only emerges when the debtor refuses to pay 
this cash and the creditor must agree to new terms in order to be compensated. That said, many 
of the same themes elucidated by anthropological research on barter elsewhere are echoed in 
narratives surrounding lanac kompenzacija, including power, trust, mutual dependence, morality, 
networks, whether voluntary or coerced, social rules, and so on. In these ways I could see why 
Istrians would make this leap to calling kompenzacija baratto.  
But this is also dangerous. Lanac kompenzacija is somewhat involuntary, does not involve 
the exchange of goods, and the transaction is rooted within the monetary economy. The fact that 
Istrians conceptualize it as baratto, however, obfuscates its actual impetus of usage, normalizes it 
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by associating it with another common practice in villages like the simple trading of vegetables 
for fruit or labour, and in doing so again feeds into this feeling that it is an acceptable practice, 
all the while in the context of informants lamenting how lanac kompenzacija deprives them of 
liquidity and costs them time and energy. When speaking with businessmen about a recent lanac 
kompenzacija arrangement and their dissatisfaction with it, they would sometimes incorporate 
narratives about how it is a common practice and like barter, as if this justified their debtor’s 
behaviour. 
Finally, informants would complicate matters by sometimes characterizing this practice as 
somehow unofficial, leading to discussions about informal business practices in general and how 
this hurts the economy and increases their own economic precarity. This initially sent me down a 
research rabbit hole of linking lanac kompenzacija to informal business practices, until I realized 
that the link to informality was simply that other kompenzacija practices are more prevalent 
between neighbours in informal exchanges. However, in lanac kompenzacija receipts are 
involved, and even state institutions like the state tax office. Such obfuscations in informants’ 
own narratives about lanac kompenzacija reveal its power in society. Its perceived inevitability 
indeed makes it inevitable. Its structural similarity with past modes of debt resolutions between 
state firms makes it familiar. Its conceptual linkage to baratto obfuscates the motivations for 
businesses like Sunsa to use it. The circulation of debt narratives informs people’s perceptions 
about how their economy works, simultaneously denying them agency in changing their local 
economy by throwing up their hands to this inevitability, to which they also contribute. Although 
they recognize that it is outside normal economic practice in normal economies, they normalize 
it in their own. Thus, unpacking the role of lanac kompenzacija in Istria’s business community 
unravels more complicated processes that are underway in this region’s transition to a market 
economy. It reveals how new relationships of obligations and favours arise from debt, how the 
characteristics of individuals become enactions that have local market value, and how an 
economy of trust may simultaneously offer a level of security in times of economic flux and 
contribute to economic insecurity in other ways. It is in this field of ambiguity that Istrians find 
themselves in the everyday of doing business nearly three decades after the fall of socialism. 
 
 
 
Smith, Economy of trust 
 
20 
 
References 
Cellarius, Barbara A. 2000. ‘You can buy almost anything with potatoes’: an examination of barter 
during economic crisis in Bulgaria, Ethnology, 39(1), 73-92. 
Dasgupta, Partha 1988. Trust as a commodity, in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: making and breaking 
cooperative relations, Oxford: Blackwell, 49-72. 
Ferraro, Emilia 2004. Owing and being in debt: a contribution from the northern Andes of Ecuador, 
Social Anthropology, 12(1), 77-94. 
Gambetta, Diego 1988. Can we trust trust?, in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: making and breaking 
cooperative relations, Oxford: Blackwell, 213-38. 
––  (1994). Godfather’s gossip, European Journal of Sociology, 35(2), 199-223. 
Grasseni, Cristina 2014. Seeds of trust: Italy’s Gruppi di Acquisto Solidale (Solidarity Purchase 
Groups), Journal of Political Ecology, 21(1), 179-92. 
Greif, Avner 1993. Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: the Maghribi 
traders’ coalition, American Economic Review, 83(3), 525-48. 
Harriss, John 2003. ‘Widening the radius of trust’: ethnographic explorations of trust and Indian 
business, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 9(4), 755-73. 
Henig, David and Nicolette Makovicky (eds.) 2017. Economies of favour after socialism. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press.  
Humphrey, Caroline 1992. Fair dealing, just rewards: the ethics of barter in North-East Nepal, in 
Caroline Humphrey and Stephen Hugh-Jones (eds.), Barter, exchange, and value: an 
anthropological approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 107-41. 
––  2000. An anthropological view of barter in Russia, in Paul Seabright (ed.), The vanishing rouble: 
barter networks and non-monetary transactions in post-Soviet societies, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 71-92. 
–– and Stephen Hugh-Jones 1992. Introduction: barter, exchange and value, in Caroline Humphrey 
and Stephen Hugh-Jones (eds.), Barter, exchange and value: an anthropological approach, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-20. 
Humphrey, John, and Hubert Schmitz 1998. Trust and inter-firm relations in developing and 
transition economies, Journal of Development Studies, 34(4), 32-61. 
Kirman, Alan P., and Nicolaas J. Vriend 2000. Learning to be loyal. A study of the Marseille fish 
market, in Domenico Delli Gatti, Mauro Gallegati, and Alan P. Kirman (eds.), Interaction and 
market structure: essays on heterogeneity in economics, Berlin: Springer Verlag, 33-56.  
Smith, Economy of trust 
 
21 
 
Ledeneva, Alena V. 1998. Russia’s economy of favors: blat, networking and informal exchange. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
–– 2006. How Russia really works: the informal practices that shaped post-Soviet politics and 
business. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
–– 2017. The ambivalence of favour, in David Henig and Nicolette Makovicky (eds.), Economies of 
favour after socialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 21-49. 
Lomnitz, Larissa Alder, and Diana Sheinbaum 2004. Trust, social networks and the informal 
economy: a comparative analysis, Review of Sociology, 10(1), 5-26. 
Lorenz, Edward H. 1988. Neither friends nor strangers: informal networks of subcontracting in 
French industry, in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: making and breaking cooperative relations, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 194-210. 
Lyon, Fergus, and Gina Porter 2009. Market institutions, trust and norms: exploring moral economies 
in Nigerian food systems, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33(5), 903-20.  
Menning, Garret 1997. Trust, entrepreneurship and development in Surat City, India, Ethnos, 62(1-
2), 59-90. 
Murphy, James T. 2002. Networks, trust, and innovation in Tanzania’s manufacturing sector, World 
Development, 30(4), 591-619. 
Offer, Avner 1997. Between the gift and the market: the economy of regard, Economic History 
Review, 50(3), 450-76. 
Pagden, Anthony 1988. The destruction of trust and its economic consequences in the case of 
eighteenth-century Naples, in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: making and breaking cooperative 
relations, Oxford: Blackwell, 127-41. 
Paine, Robert 1967. What is gossip about? An alternative hypothesis, Man, 2(2), 278-85. 
Platteau, Jean-Philippe 1994. Behind the market stage where real societies exist, Part 1: the role of 
public and private order institutions, Journal of Development Studies, 30(3), 533-77. 
Sneath, David 2012. The ‘age of the market’ and the regime of debt: the role of credit in the 
transformation of Mongolia, Social Anthropology, 20(4), 458-73. 
White, Luise 1994. Between Gluckman and Foucault: historicizing rumour and gossip, Social 
Dynamics, 20(1), 75-92. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1993. Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 36(1), 453-86. 
